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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
1A IN<'K PETERSON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20020330-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
• * * 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State submits this reply 
to points 1 and II of defendant's brief which i aisenew matters on appeal. Because I he State's 
opening brief fully addresses the argument in point III of defendant's brief, no reply to point 
III is necessary. 
I. THE STATE TIMELY APPEALED THE DISMISSAL OF COUNT 2 
In point I of his brief, defendant contends that the State's appeal from the dismissal of 
count 2 was not timely. Aple. Brf. at 3-5. According to defendant, the time for filing the 
notice of appeal began to run from the date of the preliminary hearing when the magistrate 
found the evidence insufficient to support a bindover on count 2 and orally granted the 
motion to dismiss count 2. Aple. Brf. at 3-5. Defendant's contention lacks merit. 
The law is well settled that the verbal pronouncements of the court are not appealable. 
Even "[a]n unsigned minute entry does not c: onstiti ite a final ordei foi purposes of appeal." 
State v. Crowley, 111 P.2d 198,198 (Utah 1987). The oral statement of the court announcing 
a judgment or order is not appealable "until it has been reduced to writing and signed by the 
court." State v. Wright, 904 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Utah App. 1995) (referencing sentencing). 
This requirement holds true not only for final judgments, but also for interlocutory orders. 
See, e.g., State v. Russell, 2002 UT 14 (per curiam) (holding that the Court does not have 
jurisdiction to consider appeal from a bindover order because defendant had not provided a 
copy of a signed order) (unpublished decision, Addendum A). 
Defendant cites State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1994), in support of the 
proposition that the court's verbal dismissal of Count 2 constituted a final order. Aple. Brf. 
at 4-5. Defendant's reliance on Jaeger is misplaced Jaeger in fact holds that a magistrate's 
dismissal of an Information constitutes a final order for purposes of appeal. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 
at 55. However, unlike the case here, the dismissal in Jaeger was in the form of a written 
order, not a verbal pronouncement See Jaeger, 886 P.2d at 53-54 (noting that the magistrate 
"issued a seventeen-page memorandum decision" dismissing the information for lack of 
probable cause). Jaeger, therefore, is inapposite. 
In this case, there was no signed order until after the trial court granted defendant's 
motion to suppress. After receiving evidence at the preliminary hearing, the trial court 
concluded: 
. . . I'd move to dismiss [ ] count [2] in regards to the possession [or] use of 
methamphetamine. There's been no evidence introduced to the Court that 
there's... of that object. It's not been introduced. There's no lab reports that 
have been introduced to identify it. All we have is a presumptive test of the 
officer about the substance, and there's nothing been offered to this Court in 
2 
evidence. The officer's opinion is not sufficient enough to meet the burden of 
proof as far as the object itself. 
R. 121: 39. The prosecutor countered that the State had met its burden, arguing that a 
positive field test from an experienced and trained officer was sufficient. R. 121:39-40. Not 
1211 40, The court's verbal pronouncement, however, was not reduced to writing. The 
minute entry of the preliminary hearing reflects a finding of probable cause on counts 1 and 
3 bill us iinsiKin ill IN1 I "' 1 he minute rnfr ul flic |ilcn hearing indicates that coum .. -as 
dismissed, but again is unsigned. R. 24. Only after the trial court granted defendant's 
motion to suppress the evidence seized in connection with counts 1 and 3 was a signed order 
entered '.lisnussiny "'fif charges as set forth on the Information \ee R, .S-ft, 1 12.l 
Defendant contends that the Order of Dismissal applied only to counts 1 and 3. The 
Order did in fact memorialize the court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress the 
evidence relating to counts 1 and 3. See R. 11 I However, the Order of Dismissal also stated 
that "the charges as set forth on the Information in this case are hereby dismissed." R 112 
(emphasis added). The order was not, therefore, confined to counts 1 and 3, but dismissed 
1
 Defendant argues that u[b]oth parties were aware that the only remaining 
offenses before the Court were the offenses set forth in Counts 1&3." Aple. Brf. at 4. 
Certainly, both parties understood that the magistrate had granted the motion to dismiss. 
However, the State has always maintained that an order of dismissal was necessary. See 
R. 97-98. 
3 
without restriction "the charges as set forth on the Information," which included count 2. R. 
112.2 
Because the Order dismissed all the charges in the Information, it constituted "a final 
judgment of dismissal," rather than an interlocutory order. See Utah Code Ann. § 77- 18a-
l(2)(a) (providing that "a dismissal of a felony information following a refusal to bind the 
defendant over for trial" is a final judgment of dismissal); see also Jaeger, 886 P.2d at 55. 
Accordingly, the State had 30 days within which to file a notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. 
P. 3(a); 4(a). The Order of Dismissal was entered on April 1, 2002 and the State filed its 
notice of appeal on April 22,2002. See R. 112,114. Therefore, the State's appeal is timely. 
II. THE STATE'S APPEAL IS NOT MOOT 
In point II of his brief, defendant argues that the State's appeal is moot because the 
trial court granted his motion to suppress the evidence. This claim also lacks merit 
As explained in the State's opening brief, Aplt. Brf. at 3, counts 1 and 3 were based on 
evidence seized from defendant's vehicle at the Lindon Boat Harbor on the night of October 
18, 2000. R. 5-6; R. 121: 7, 12-15. Count 2, on the other hand, was based on evidence 
2
 If, as defendant suggests, count 2 was not dismissed by the order, this Court is 
without jurisdiction and the appeal should be dismissed without prejudice pending entry 
of a signed order. Cf. State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, f 14,51 P.3d 55 (dismissing 
defendant's appeal without prejudice subject to entry of a judgment of conviction). 
4 
seized from defendant's residence later that night pursuant to defendant's consent. R. 6; R. 
121:34-36. After the magistrate bound defendant over for trial on counts 1 and 3, defendant 
moved to suppress only the evidence seized from his person and vehicle on October 18, 
2000. R. 26-28 (Addendum B). He did not move to suppress the evidence seized from his 
bedroom later that night, see R. 26-28, and the State did not therefore address that issue in its 
memorandum opposing the motion to suppress, see R. 33-36. Thus, contrary to his claim in 
point II of his brief, defendant did not move to suppress all the evidence "obtained by the 
police in connection with his arrest and detention/' but only that evidence seized in 
connection with the search of his person and vehicle at the boat harbor. Aple. Brf. at 5. 
Given the magistrate's refusal to bind defendant over for trial on count 2, defendant's 
failure to move for the suppression of the evidence seized from his bedroom is not surprising. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that defendant did not move for the suppression of the 
methamphetamine. Because the court's grant of defendant's motion only resulted in the 
suppression of evidence seized from his vehicle, it does not render moot the State's claim 
that the magistrate improperly dismissed count 2, which was based on the methamphetamine 
seized from defendant's bedroom. 
Admittedly, a finding that the search of the vehicle was illegal might render the 
subsequent consent search invalid. As observed by the Utah Supreme Court, "a defendant's 
consent to a search following illegal police activity is [nevertheless] valid under the Fourth 
Amendment... if both of the following tests are met: "(i) The consent was given voluntarily, 
and (ii) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." State v. 
5 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1262 (Utah 1993). Therefore, even assuming that the search of the 
vehicle was illegal, it does not necessarily follow that the subsequent consent search was also 
unlawful.3 However, the issue of consent was not brought before the trial court. It was 
neither raised by defendant in his motion to suppress, nor was it addressed in the State's 
memorandum opposing the motion. This Court will not therefore address it for the first time 
onappeal. See State v. Archambeau, S2QP2d9209922(\JtahApp. 1991). This is especially 
true where, as here, the factual circumstances surrounding the consent were not explored at 
the evidentiary hearing. See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,887 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons and those stated in the opening brief, the State respectfully requests 
the Court to reverse the order of dismissal and remand this case for further proceedings-
It is important to note that the trial court granted the motion to suppress not on 
the merits, but because 'the State [was] not ready to proceed" R. 124: 9. As a result, 
should this Court reverse the dismissal of count 2 and defendant thereafter move to 
suppress the evidence seized from the bedroom, the trial court may consider on the merits 
the legality of the search of the vehicle in determining the validity of the consent search 
of the bedroom. Cf. Utah R. Crim. P. 25 (providing that court may dismiss information 
for unreasonable delay in bringing defendant to trial, but such dismissal does not bar 
further prosecution of offense). 
6 
Respectfully submitted this /O day of January, 2003 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
S.GRAY 
5SISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15 day of January, 2003,1 served two copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant upon the defendant/appellee, Lance Peterson, by causing 
them to be delivered by first class mail to his/her counsel of record, as follows: 
Michael D. Esplin 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 








IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Ouray Russell, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20010791-CA 
F I L E D 
January 17, 2002 
|| 2002UTApp14 [I 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Ann Boyden 
Attorneys: 
Victor Marshall Gordon, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark Shurtleff and Brett J. DeiPorto, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Thome. 
PER CURIAM: 
This case is before the court on what appears to be an appeal from an order binding Appellant over to stand trial 
on criminal charges. Appellant has not provided a copy of the order from which he appeals. Appellant has also 
failed to file a docketing statement and has not responded to this courts sua sponte notice of consideration for 
summary disposition. Appellee did file a response to the notice. 
Because Appellant does not appeal from a signed, final appealable order, this court does not have jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal. Se$ Utah R. App. P. 3(a). Moreover, Appellant has not sought permission to appeal an 
interlocutory order pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, the appeal is 
dismissed based on lack of jurisdiction without 
prejudice to filing an appeal upon obtaining a final order or judgment. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
William A. Thome, Jr., Judge 
Addendum B 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box L 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: (801) 373-4912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, 




COMES NOW the defendant and hereby moves to suppress the evidence 
obtained during a s§ai£^^f|ui.person and which occurred on October 18,2001, 
upon the grounds that the search was conducted in violation of his right to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure under the provisions of the Fourth 
1 
Amendment and Article I Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Specifically, defendant asserts the following grounds for suppressing evidence. 
1. That the search was conducted without a search warrant. 
2. That the law enforcement officers had no probable cause to search the 
person of the defendant or the vehicle of the defendant. 
3. That the search of defendant's person and vehicle was without consent. 
4. That the search of the defendant's person and vehicle was not pursuant to 
arrest. 
5. That the search exceeded the scope of the officer's authority under U.C.A. 
§ 77-7-16. 
6. That the defendant was unconstitutionally detained. 
7. That the detention and search of the defendant's person and vehicle was in 
violation of the constitutional provisions set forth above and the following case law: 
State v. LopezLm?.2dJL 127jTJtah 1994); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State 
v. Roybal, 1X1 P.2d 291(Utah 1986); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985); 
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); and Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 
2 
366 (1993). 
The search in this matter being a warrantless search, the burden is upon the 
state to justify the search. Defendant requests this matter be set for hearing on 
defendant's morion. 
Dated this 18* day of January, 20001. 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing motion to the 
following: 
KAYBRYSON 
Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
ll5k this fr day of January, 2001 
